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Introduction 
 On the periphery of Portland, Oregon, at the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia 
rivers lies an expansive wetland, the Columbia Slough. Once a thriving wetland ecosystem 
nineteen miles long by three miles wide, the Slough has been drained, filled, and developed into 
a humanized landscape. The human experience of this landscape has always been about use: 
people make, move, and exchange things here. Few people actually live and play in this 
transformed wetland, and most would consider it a featureless, polluted, and otherwise valueless 
landscape save for the money to be made here. Yet remnants of the old, wild landscape survive 
in mostly small and fragmented enclaves; they have withstood over a century's worth of human 
encroachment and pollution. This is the Columbia Sloughscape
1
. 
 This complex landscape that is both exploited and polluted for commerce, and valued for 
its natural amenities, has been instrumental to the economic history of Portland. What makes the 
landscape a good wetland, its large flat terrain near major waterways, also makes it a good place 
for airports, railroads, highways, and shipping terminals. With good access to transportation and 
close proximity to Portland, the Slough became an ideal place for industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural enterprises. The Slough was effectively drained between 1918 and 1921, opening up 
nearly fifty square miles of this premium real estate. Soon after drainage, the Slough quickly 
became less of a wetland landscape and more of an industrial landscape, instituting a struggle 
between natural capital and financial capital. 
                                                 
1
 “Sloughscape” in this paper refers to the Columbia Slough landscape. It is used to draw attention to the unique 
qualities of the Columbia Slough landscape, consisting of highly integrated built and natural landscapes, wetscapes, 
and hardscapes. 
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  The changing landscape of the Slough is a reflection of our changing perspective of 
wetlands. Once seen as a dark and fearsome mire, the wetland became a redeemable landscape 
that could and should be drained, and now represents a valued, even treasured, wetland 
wilderness worthy of preservation. The history of the Slough reflects this changing ideology and 
the interventions premised in changing visions, transformed from an uninhabited wasteland, to a 
drained and developed economic pollutoscape, to today’s place with protected wild spaces and 
improved ecological health. 
 Using the Columbia Slough as a case study, this paper examines how our shifting 
perspectives of wetlands have influenced the evolution of wetland landscapes. I start by 
establishing the physical geography of the Slough in order to lay the groundwork for the 
subsequent landscape discussion. It is followed by review of the existing geographic literature on 
reading landscapes and the cultural values reflected therein. Then I track the history and 
development of national wetland management, looking at the cultural, political, economic, and 
technological factors that all played vital roles in shaping wetland management in the U.S.  I 
follow the arc of federal wetland management policy from endorsement to condemnation of 
wetland drainage through present day. 
Then, using the Columbia Slough as a case study, I demonstrate how the arc of federal 
wetland policy and perception is reflected in the Columbia Slough landscape. I look at how the 
Slough landscape changed under drainage and how the local values and perceptions of the 
Slough have shifted over time just as national policies shifted. I follow that trend through the 
1980s when we started acknowledging the Slough as a place to preserve, instituting legally 
protected wild spaces, regulating water quality, and supporting watershed education. 
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 I conclude by discussing the recent developments in the Slough's health and the efforts 
that continue to help restore it. These results and continued efforts are a reflection of how we as 
a community of Portland-area residents view the Slough. The Columbia Slough Watershed 
Council has been at the forefront of many of these restoration efforts, engaging and educating 
the community about the Slough's ecology and the ongoing projects to help improve it. And this 
is how the landscape is currently changing, shaping the wetland perspective of future generations 
through education. 
 
I. The Columbia Sloughscape 
A. Slough in Space  
 The Columbia Slough watershed is not a true drainage basin. It is a wetland flood plain 
of the Columbia River that has been hydrologically severed from the fluctuations of the river by 
human manipulation. The watershed now known as the Columbia Slough drains fifty-one square 
miles of land adjacent to the Columbia River, its main channel stretching nineteen miles from 
the 102-acre Fairview Lake one mile east of the Sandy River mouth to the mouth of the 
Willamette River (Portland 2005a) (Map 1). Additionally, the watershed includes thirty miles of 
secondary waterways in lakes and small tributaries (Portland 2005a). The Slough occupies the 
natural flood plain of the Columbia River, the stream gradient is almost flat and there is little 
relief across the watershed. Seasonal fluctuations of the Columbia River once cut new channels  
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and flooded the wetland, establishing a highly dynamic landscape continually upturning the soils 
with fresh organic material. Blue Lake, in the eastern part of the watershed, was one of the water 
bodies that experienced seasonal changes in water levels, but, like Fairview Lake, levees, dikes, 
and gates now regulate the exchange of freshwater between the river and lakes and along the 
Slough (Portland 2005a). 
With nutrient-rich soils and an aquifer that provides drinking water, the underlying 
geology of the Columbia Slough basin is an important asset to the region. The bedrock consists 
of Columbia River Basalts, a relic of multiple lava flows that blanketed much of the region 
around sixteen million years ago during the Miocene. Then, about ten million years ago, when 
the volcanoes of the Miocene Cascades were active, mudflows, ash and mixed volcanic debris 
began to flow into the Columbia River channel. The river carried the debris which then settled 
across the Portland Basin, extending as far south as the Tualatin Valley and north into Clark 
County. Today, the Troutdale Formation, with its loosely mixed sand and gravel, has become an 
important aquifer for the surrounding local communities, including Portland and Vancouver. The 
formation is deep enough not to be affected by the surface water quality problems in the Slough 
basin, but is still accessible for groundwater pumping. This formation is also responsible for the 
watershed boundary along the north shore of Fairview Lake, running between it and Blue Lake 
to the North, and dividing the lakes into two different basins (Bishop 2003, Orr and Orr 1999). 
Other important geologic features in the basin include Grant Butte, where Fairview Creek 
begins. The butte is one of many volcanoes in the Boring Lava Field that emerged during the late 
Pliocene. Ash and debris from these local volcanoes added another layer of sediment on the 
Troutdale Formation. Then, from about fifteen to thirteen thousand years ago, the Missoula 
Source: USGS Elevation Data 2017 
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Map 2: Headwaters of the Columbia Slough at Fairview Lake 
Floods deposited more gravel and alluvium across the region, forming Rocky Butte and Alameda 
Ridge, making up part of the southern boundary of the watershed. The Sandy River forms the 
eastern boundary of the Slough watershed, draining a glacier of the same name on Mt.Hood. The 
sandy sediment found around this river and in eastern parts of the Slough is considered to be a 
relic of the Mt. Hood lahars that have occurred over the past fifteen thousand years (Orr and Orr 
1999).  
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B. Hydrology 
             Today, Fairview Creek, Wilkes Creek, and Osborn Creek are the Slough's only 
tributaries (Map 2 and 3). Development in the watershed has effectively put all other tributaries 
into pipes underground to be discharged directly into the Slough. Fairview Creek is the largest 
tributary, running five miles from its source at Grant Butte near 182nd and SE Division to its 
mouth at Fairview Lake. Other tributaries include the tiny Osborn and Wilkes Creeks, entering 
the main channel of the Slough at approximately 190th and 170th avenues respectively. The 
watershed also contains many lakes and other small waterways, the largest of which include 
Smith and Bybee lakes, the Peninsula Drainage Canal, Whitaker Ponds, Fairview Lake, and 
Johnson Lake. Every body of water in the watershed has a history of severe impacts from human 
development, and it is only recently that measures have been taken to mitigate some of the 
damage from pollution and disturbance (Portland BES 2005).  
 The Slough is hydrologically separated into three segments roughly corresponding with 
the drainage district boundaries. The upper Slough includes Fairview Lake and all three 
tributaries downstream for three miles to the Mid-Dike levee at about NE 142nd avenue. The 
middle Slough extends from the Mid-Dike levee six miles downstream to the Pen 2 levee at 
approximately NE 18th avenue, where another pump is located. Because of its very low stream 
elevation gradient, tidal fluctuations and reduced late summer flows can cause the lower Slough 
to move very slowly or even in reverse, backing up the entire middle Slough. The purpose of the 
Pen 2 levee pump is to counteract this by pumping the Slough downstream. The lower Slough 
segment extends from the Pen 2 levee to the mouth nine miles downstream, where the Slough 
meets the Willamette River. This segment is sensitive to tidal fluctuations of between twelve and 
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twenty-four inches twice a day that back up the Slough for miles (Portland BES 2005).  
 
C. Wildlife and natural spaces 
 The Columbia Slough wetland habitat supports many species, including some on the 
Endangered Species list. bald eagles, willow flycatchers, western pond turtles, and coho and 
Chinook salmon are among those species listed that spend time in the Slough. In addition, the 
Slough supports more than 175 species of birds, four species of turtles, twenty-six species of 
fish, and mammals such as deer, coyote, beaver, and river otter. However, native species 
Map 3: The middle stretch of the Columbia Slough extends from Wilkes Creek to Buffalo 
Slough 
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continue to face serious threats of extinction from habitat loss and invasive species 
encroachment. Few protected natural spaces remain in the Slough for native species to flourish; 
perhaps the most important of these is the Smith and Bybee Wetland area. 
The most prominent natural feature in the watershed, Smith and Bybee Lakes and the 
adjacent wetland area, is located along the lower Slough (Map 4), and is also one of the largest 
urban freshwater wetlands in the country at over two thousand acres, supporting a diverse array 
of year-round and seasonal residents. To underscore the importance of this natural space, Smith 
and Bybee Wetlands are a stop along the Pacific Flyway, a network of lakes and wetlands from 
Patagonia to Alaska that provide migrating birds a safe place to rest and recoup along their 
journey (Houck and Cody 2000).  
 The native trees and shrubs of the Columbia Slough include black cottonwood, red-osier 
dogwood, Oregon ash, and Oregon white oak. These are important species endemic to the 
Willamette Valley ecoregion that can survive in persistently wet soils, such as those in wetlands 
(Thorson et al. 2003). The once ubiquitous native Columbia sedge and wapato, famously known 
as a staple food for many local tribes, have been decimated by the arrival of invasive species like 
Himalayan blackberry, English ivy, and reed canarygrass (Lev et al. 1994). Today, there are few 
remnant high quality habitats within the watershed, and habitat connectivity is a major concern 
as commercial and industrial development have fragmented the landscape extensively. Much of 
the wetlands were drained initially for agricultural use, but industrial, commercial, and 
residential developments have since been built over the farms. This development has effected a 
landscape with very little open space or wetland habitat for the native species.  
 The general decline of ecological health in the Slough stems almost entirely from one 
  Pemberton 10 
thing: poor water quality as a result of development. When the entire watershed thrived with 
healthy populations of native species, the Columbia River flood waters would provide seasonal 
freshets that would flush the wetlands with fresh clean water. The native flora and fauna thrived 
under these conditions that relied on seasonal fluctuations of water. When the first levees were 
built in the Slough around 1920, the seasonal water regime that this robust ecosystem relied on 
was drastically altered. By channelizing the Slough, building levees, and draining the lowlands, 
the watershed could then be developed, paving nearly all of the twenty-five square miles of 
former wetland. The surrounding urbanized areas, in turn, drained their surface runoff into the 
Slough, compounding the effects of the disrupted water regime.  
The Columbia Slough is a complex landscape that has had a long history of human 
occupation and exploitation. At first glance, it may appear a derelict space whose greatest use is 
a thoroughfare for people and goods traveling to another destination, a “fly-over” landscape. But 
a closer examination tells a story of a once-thriving ecosystem that was dehydrated and 
suffocated by asphalt and concrete. The drainage of the Slough, and subsequent decline of the 
landscape, was the result of a half-century long battle between the federal government and 
wetlands. The next section lays out how the United States administered, organized, and  















































































  Pemberton 12 
subsidized the drainage of wetlands, contextualizing the drainage of the Slough at the national 
level. 
The Slough is a landscape of utility, as the majority of the watershed is privately owned 
and non-residential (Metro 2010). Furthermore, an expansive industrial sanctuary exists in the 
center of the watershed, regulating land use to preserve industrial development. But how did this 
once thriving wetland become a literal sanctuary for pollution, or, alternatively, how did this 
once undevelopable landscape become a regional economic hub? This paper looks at the 
historical evolution of the landscape, in the context of national wetland management, to examine 
how shifting cultural values and geography have forged the Columbia Slough landscape seen 
today. 
 
II. Literature review 
 Geography provides a framework to understand this transformation while considering the 
many facets and contributing forces to the changing landscape. The idea of landscape 
interpretation within Cultural Geography examines the transformations and meanings of 
landscapes: how they evolved, how they function, and what they mean to different groups of 
people (Meinig 1979). This paper uses this framework to interpret the Columbia Slough 
landscape in its historical context. 
  
Landscape 
Looking at where the idea of landscape originated, Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels 
trace it back to the Italian Renaissance, where they define landscape as a way of seeing and as a 
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representation of power (Cosgrove 1984; Cosgrove 1985; and Cosgrove and Daniels 1988). 
They argue that the idea of landscape was borne out of landscape painting, linking the 
development of the landscape idea to the development of modern capitalism through the 
“practical appropriation of space” (Cosgrove 1985, 46). Landscape painting works to create a 
“visual ideology” of real life, suggesting a one true way of seeing. Furthermore, the powerful 
and wealthy were the only ones that could afford to commission an artist to depict a landscape, 
thus establishing the concept of landscape as something only controlled and accessed by the 
powerful (Cosgrove 1984; Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Mitchell 2000).  
With roots in Sauer’s “Morphology of Landscape” (1925), reading the landscape as a 
book “authored” by culture was first made explicit by Peirce Lewis (1979) and Donald Meinig 
(1979; Mitchell 2000; Schein 1997). In his “Axioms for reading the landscape,” Lewis writes 
that “Our human landscape is our unwitting autobiography, reflecting our tastes, our values, our 
aspirations, and even our fears in tangible, visible form” (1979, 12). This concept of landscape, 
however, drew criticism from those who thought it too simplistic a model, the leading voices of 
which one James Duncan and Nancy Duncan (1988; Duncan 1990; Barnes and Duncan 1988). 
They thought the metaphor needed to be deepened, that geographers needed to examine how 
landscapes “encode” the information in the landscape, and consider how power relations shape 
and control the interpretation of the landscape (Schein 1997). 
Duncan and Duncan (1988) argue that reading the landscape is something that we all do, 
experts and laymen alike who go about their ordinary day, each interacting with and changing 
the cultural landscape, however imperceptible, while also being a part of it. This is what they 
refer to as “intertextuality,” where “the context of any text is other texts” (Duncan 1990, 4). The 
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cultural landscape is a living thing that changes continuously, and everything is a text that can be 
read and reshaped in our everyday cultural practices (Schein 2009). 
Citing Lefebvre (1991), Mitchell (2000) discusses the shortcomings of the landscape-as-
text metaphor, noting that most readers may be reading the same material landscape but be 
reading radically different texts based on their own tastes, values and fears. Hence, the process 
of reading the landscape as text “runs the risk of reducing the lives and experiences to merely the 
thought” (Mitchell 2000, 123). Mitchell (2000) concludes that “landscape is best seen as a force 
in, and place for, the social reproduction of society” (144), and that “like culture, [landscape] 
seeks to regularize and naturalize relations between people” (144). However, despite his critique 
of Lewis’s landscape metaphor, Mitchell (2000) agrees that history is a crucial factor in 
understanding landscape (145). 
The Columbia Slough landscape does this through its complex and integrated network of 
built and natural environments. The entire Slough has been a contested space since the building, 
establishment, and peopling of the Portland area, beginning around the 1830s (Abbot 1999). And 
the current complex of land uses and ideals is the product of over a century of shifting cultural 
values encoded in the landscape. This paper aims to examine the causes of these shifts, and to 
look at how the landscape works to serve those cultural ideals. 
In Lewis’s “Axioms for reading the landscape” (1979), he highlights the importance of 
understanding the history of a landscape in order to more fully understand the landscape itself. 
He breaks down this examination into two parts: “The corollary of historic lumpiness,” and “the 
mechanical (or technological) corollary.” “Historic lumpiness” refers to the knickpoints, or 
points in time that can be referred to as causing significant change in history where significant 
  Pemberton 15 
cultural change is provoked by wars, depressions, and major inventions. Eras of common 
cultural values are “lumped” together, their boundaries in time somewhat discretely defined by 
knickpoints. The major knickpoints in the history of drained wetland landscapes include 
legislation (Swampland Act, Clean Water Act, etc.), technological advances (tiling, steam-
engine, etc.), and societal stressors (floods, wars, depression, etc.).  
 Lewis’s “mechanical corollary” underscores the importance of understanding specifically 
how the landscape works and has changed over time. He writes that understanding this is crucial 
to the understanding of the landscape as a whole. I apply this in my analysis of the Columbia 
Slough landscape, looking specifically at how the landscape operates: the drainage districts, 
major industries, people, and natural environment.  
 
Place 
Cresswell (2015) discusses the difference between “place” and “landscape” as the duality 
of being inside and outside of an environment. He writes that landscapes are to be observed from 
the outside, and places are to be lived in. Similarly, Tuan (1977) defines “place” as the 
destination to which you travel through “space” to arrive; space is the area between places. The 
Columbia Slough is both space and place, and  is many different places to many different people. 
For many thousands of people, it is where they work, making their livelihood to support 
themselves and others. For others, the Slough is where they fish, despite the health risks, because 
it is a place that reminds them of their home in another country (Profita 2012). And for the 
countless others who arrive and depart daily from Portland International Airport, the Slough is a 
place with a multitude of different meanings. However, while the idea of place is near that of 
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landscape, and is certainly a subject worth studying in the Slough, this paper is not about the 
assembly of places that constitute the Slough. It is about how the landscape has evolved with and 
to be a representation of the dominant culture in the Slough, that is, of course, the culture of 
those who own and control the landscape. 
The experience of landscape is built on the reconciliation of one’s perceived environment 
with their own knowledge and memory of the place (Tuan 1974, Meinig 1979, Lewis 1979). As 
culture changes, so do perception and perspective of the landscape, which can then usher in a 
change of the landscape. This concept, in the context of wetlands on a regional scale, is the 
subject of Hugh Prince’s book, Wetlands of the American Midwest: A Historical Geography of 
Changing Attitudes (2008). Prince tracks the changes in peoples’ perception of wetlands through 
history and how the management of wetlands in the Midwest changed relative to perception. He 
covers the history of wetland occupation, use, and management across six Midwestern states 
over 300 years. Prince discusses how Native Americans, fur-trappers, farmers and industrialists, 
and modern recreationists have each had a nuanced perception of wetlands, and how that shift in 
dominant cultural values has influenced the shape of the landscape. 
Others have written about the landscape history of Portland and the surrounding area 
(Lang 1999; Abbot 1999; Robbins 1999; White 1995), but the scales of these studies are larger 
than what is being discussed in this paper. The cultural landscape of the Columbia Slough is 
separate from that of the surrounding metropolitan region because it is rooted in a history of 
wetland drainage. Historically, the landscape was the last area near the city to be developed 
because of its inaccessibility as a wetland (Abbot 1999). Now, because of drainage, the 
watershed is almost entirely developed, a veritable landscape of industry, economy, and 
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transportation. 
 Stroud (1995; 1999) writes on the environmental and social history of the Columbia 
Slough, focusing on the theme of environmental injustice. Stroud discusses how minorities were 
disproportionately affected by the pollution caused by the Peninsula Industrial District, and that 
the city was not doing enough to mitigate it. I refer to Stroud’s work throughout this paper, 
particularly in the discussion of Vanport. 
 This paper is structured around the idea of reading the landscape through its historical 
context. I examine how wetland policy and perception has changed over time at the federal level, 
and then look at how those same patterns are observed in the Columbia Slough. Reading the 
Columbia Slough landscape in this context is essential for understanding how the it became what 
it is today and the direction it is heading for the future. This research has implications for 
planners, students of wetland geography, and city officials who are looking to gain a greater 
understanding of this complex landscape. 
 
III. Wetlands in America 
The landscape of the Columbia Slough is rooted in the larger history of wetland 
management in America. Native Americans had been altering wetland landscapes long before 
Europeans arrived through controlled fires, logging, and the cultivation of wild foods (Cronon 
1983; Pyne 1982; Denevan 1992). This paper, however, will focus on the evolution of wetland 
management from a governmental perspective. For a discussion of wetland management in the 
pre-Columbian period by geographers, see above. 
 Since the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. government tried to implement strategies to 
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convert wetlands into developable land. To achieve this, large and small scale drainage projects 
were implemented to carry water away from saturated soils, making them dry enough to build 
structures and raise crops. The drainage district was the governing body created to administer the 
drainage projects in a given watershed. As the organizational structure, funding, and power of 
the drainage district evolved over the latter half of the nineteenth century, so did the technology 
used to physically alter the landscape. These factors culminated in the early twentieth century 
with new legislation allowing drainage districts the physical and political tools to drain wetlands, 
catalyzing the drainage of the Slough in 1918. 
 
A. Agrarianism and the early American land ethic 
 Agrarianism was a dominant theme in early American culture and played a critical role in 
the rhetoric surrounding wetland drainage legislation. Inspired by Thomas Jefferson, agrarianism 
is considered to be a value intrinsic to the very identity of America. Under agrarianism, the 
independent and land-based ideal of farming stood for virtue and health, and the farmer was 
considered a pillar of the community, to be respected based on his apparent morality evidenced 
by his honest and hard-working lifestyle (Danborn 1991). Early American agrarianism fostered a 
land ethic that held farming as the highest and most important use of land, and land that was not 
working was being wasted (Malone 1993). Hence, wetlands, with their saturated soils and 
inaccessibility, drew the ire of many. 
 The Romantic Period of the early nineteenth century accentuated these tenants of 
agrarianism by glorifying natural landscapes, painting beautiful scenery as heavenly places. And 
although they were natural landscapes, wetlands were not painted in this same light. As 
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Cosgrove and Daniels (1988) discuss, landscape painting was an expression of power and 
control over the natural world, depicting a true way of seeing nature. During the Romantic 
period, picturesque landscapes were glorified and unknown, unproductive landscapes like 
wetlands were demonized (Figs. 1 and 2). The farm and range lands stood for all that was good, 
holy, and safe, where all of those agrarian ideals could be exercised and pursued. The swamps, 
however, stood for the dark, mysterious, and evil places where disease and dangerous creatures 
resided, an impenetrable mire, and, for all intents and purposes, the Hell to their pastoral Heaven 
(Bunce 1994; Miller 1989). Tuan (1977) writes “Myths flourish in the absence of precise 
knowledge” (85). In the case of wetlands in the nineteenth century, their demonization is linked 
to their inaccessibility, and that stigma begins to dissolve around the turn of the century as 
wetlands are drained. 
Fig 1: Cropsey, Jasper. Haymaking. 1853 
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With the newly acquired 1803 Louisiana Purchase, 1845 Texas Annexation, 1846 Oregon 
Territory, and 1848 Mexican Cession, the federal government found itself with more than twice 
as much land as it had in its first thirty years of existence (Meinig 1995). Land disposition 
became a top priority and the federal land disposition program began in 1812 with the creation 
of the General Land Office to oversee all of the unclaimed public land, the “public domain” 
(Meinig 1995). Made famous for the Homestead Acts of the 1860s and 1870s, the land disposal 
programs refer to many pieces of legislation that transferred ownership of public domain land to 
states or individuals to manage, sell, live on, or make any productive use of. These agrarian 
values would be codified specifically for wetlands in 1849 with the passage of the Swamplands 
Act, a land disposal law, focusing on the conversion of wetlands to economically viable land, 
Fig. 2: Chapman, John Gadsby. Lake of the Dismal Swamp. 1842 
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primarily for cultivation (McCorvie and Lant 1993). 
 
B. Passing the first wetland drainage legislation 
With flooding becoming more of a problem due to the unilateral increase of 
industrialization, farming, and population, people sought a scapegoat in swamps. According to 
the American government of the 1840s, swamps were underused spaces where stagnant waters 
and saturated soils restricted human progress during an age where westward expansion and 
manifest destiny were the American prerogative (Prince 1997; Meinig 1995). Draining the 
swamps was considered a solution to make the land more conducive to development while 
presumably reducing flood risk. 
 Federally endorsed wetland drainage started with the Swamp Land Act (SLA) of 1849. 
Louisiana was the first and only state affected by the initial law, which included public land that 
was not arable and therefore not suitable for the federal land disposition programs administered 
by the General Land Office created that same year. While the land disposition programs 
encouraged people to move out west, the SLA simply transferred ownership of the swamp lands 
to the states, which would then theoretically sell the land to the public with the intent to build 
levees and then drain the land, making it arable and habitable (Beauchamp 1987).  
 
C. Defining “Swamp”  
 The following year, twelve other states were granted land in the Swamp Land Act (SLA) 
of 1850 that were considered “swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cultivation” 
(Bogue 1959, 46). The legal definition of a swamp then as now is an ambiguous and imprecise 
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one, as most wetlands may or may not have visible surface water and may only be seasonally 
wet. Even today, wetlands are officially defined somewhat ambiguously, as evidenced by this 
definition from the Clean Water Act that is used by most government agencies: "wetlands are 
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration 
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions” (Clean Water Act of 1972). The current 
definition still focuses on the saturation of soils, and frequency of inundation, coupled with a 
suite of other environmental factors including topography, drainage, and fauna. The biggest 
difference between our current definition and the one provided in the initial SLA is that we have 
much more accurate means of measuring soil types and saturation, and more data to support 
inundation frequency and soil saturation trends, allowing us to quantify precise characteristics of 
a wetland. 
 Aside from the definition of “swamp”, the term itself brought about significant 
discussion in Congress. Swamps were held in low regard, and the passing of the SLA was the 
grand stage for congressmen to verbalize their fears and grievances against swamps to formally 
endorse a congressional act to rid the country of them. For example, senators in the lower 
Mississippi basin associated swamps with flood damage and dangerous health effects, calling 
them “generative and noxious influences,” “injurious to human health,” “fever and ague lands,” 
“pestilential,” and “prolific of disease and inflicting of a curse” (Vileisis 1997, 74). Then, 
unfamiliar with the Mississippi Valley, Connecticut Representative Chauncey Cleveland argued 
that overflowed lands were fertile and excellent for growing crops. He thought the SLA gave 
away too much good land (Cowdrey 1971). Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton furthered this 
  Pemberton 23 
notion by describing swamps as “a refuge for wild animals that prey upon the stock of the people 
of the country,” and that they “acted as impediments to progress of the people in the going from 
one part to another” (Vileisis 1997, 75).  
Not only did swamps directly impede the working of the land with their impenetrable 
saturation, but they also impeded economic progress by blocking access to markets (Cowdrey 
1971). As discussed in reference to the Columbia Slough later in this paper, drained wetlands 
make for great transportation corridors by offering flat terrain near shipping routes. Thus, 
wetland drainage removed barriers and opened up highly accessible land for agricultural and 
industrial development and transportation. 
  The SLA would pass in 1849, but not without Louisiana 
Senator Solomon Downs (Fig. 3) explaining how wetland 
drainage could exacerbate flooding downstream, “It is 
reasonable to suppose that the whole country is now more 
rapidly and thoroughly drained into the Mississippi than when in 
a state of nature. Then no doubt, a great quantity of water was 
collected in pools and swamps, and there remained until carried 
by gradual evaporation” (Terry 1935, 45). He referenced Charles 
Ellet Jr. (Fig. 4), a civil engineer who was notorious for not cooperating with government 
projects, earning a reputation as an argumentative rabble-rouser. One of Ellet’s theories 
described the negative watershed-scale hydrologic effects of development, urbanization, and 
levees, and acknowledged the reduction of wetlands and natural spaces as water holding and 
flood mitigating resources (Lewis 1968).  
Fig. 3: Louisiana Senator 
Solomon Weathersbee Downs 
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 Ellet's theories on flood control correctly explained how 
the most effective flood mitigation is concerned with slowing the 
water down so it is not all in the river at the same time. This is 
achieved by sequestering the water temporarily in wetlands and 
natural spaces that have small water bodies and a soil profile that 
retains moisture well. Ellet's theories would fall on deaf ears for 
over a hundred more years until federally subsidized drainage 
projects would cease in the 1950s. 
 After Downs explained Ellet’s theories on river hydrology, 
arguing against levees as effective flood control, Congress proposed more levee building and 
drainage to prevent flooding downstream. The initial swamp land bill pertained only to 
Louisiana and easily passed Congress in March of 1849. Thirteen more states would be granted 
land under the SLA the following year, and Oregon would wait until 1860 for their own drainage 
legislation (McCorvie and Lant 1993). But the larger discussion of what to do with the vast 
amounts of federally held wetlands had begun and the whole country was interested in states 
becoming more prosperous by converting wetlands into arable, developable land. 
 Senator Downs was alone in Congress in his fight against wetland drainage. Several 
other congressmen had as much to say as Senator Downs, but in support of drainage. Three main 
reasons emerged from those hearings, resulting in the passing of the law (Beauchamp 1987): 
1) Wetland soils could not support agriculture or structural development, making them 
economically unviable, and inaccessible.  
2) Malaria was associated with wetlands, and thus drainage was thought to benefit 
Fig. 4: Charles Ellet Jr., 
c.1850 
  Pemberton 25 
public health. 
3) Draining wetlands removed barriers and created farmland with excellent accessibility.  
 
D. Drainage Districts and The Louisiana Experiment 
 In 1852, the Louisiana state government began giving structure to the new wetland 
disposition program. This was done by creating drainage districts to govern topographically and 
hydrologically similar regions. Districts fitting the established definition of “swamp” were 
subject to the Swamp Land Act (SLA) disposition program and each unit was responsible for its 
own levees. As the nation was going through serious growing pains with the newly acquired 
West expanding the country's area by two-thirds and a civil war looming, this was a new style of 
increased governmental oversight over a new and strange jurisdictional boundary (Strausberg 
1977).  
 The districts were administered by Boards of Swamp Land Commissioners who each 
oversaw drainage and reclamation in their own district. The revenue from selling the granted 
swampland went to the board, who would then collectively decide which projects were most 
critical. Then the board would hire the lowest bidding contractor and see that the projects were 
completed. The most urgent projects took precedence, and usually involved the repair of existing 
levees (Harrison 1951). In theory, this seemed like a straightforward and simple process, but the 
administrative and technological learning curve proved to be steep as fraudulent land dealings 
and engineering shortfalls plagued the program from the start. 
 There was a fundamental lack of hydrologic and engineering expertise that resulted in 
levees being built too close to the river, with an undersized base, or with inadequate material that 
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eroded quickly. Furthermore, members of the board representing their districts conflicted in their 
fundamental approach to how swamp lands should be reclaimed. For example, some 
commissioners insisted on building big solid levees to force the river to downcut and expedite 
the water downstream, while others felt that a system of drains and distributary bayous was the 
best approach to controlling flooding. So often a mix of both or some other approach was used, 
often coupled with unsound engineering, resulting in an ineffective and/ or poorly executed 
flood control solution, leaving the land behind the levees still inaccessible to farmers and 
developers (Harrison 1951).  
 The boards of commissioners were susceptible to persuasive landowners lubricating the 
process in their favor, showing preference in the projects they chose and the expediency with 
which they were completed (Hewes and Frandson 1952). Generally, progress was slow, partially 
because seasonal flooding often limited the window for construction to the summer months, and 
in cases of malarial outbreaks, laborers willing to work on the levees were hard to find; however, 
many complained about the slow pace with which the Board worked to decide on projects, 
contractors, and budgets (Cowdrey 1977). Additionally, the board fell under scrutiny when 
audits revealed poor accounting records and questionable purchases, with one auditor calling a 
recently purchased piece of dredging equipment “an extravagant piece of furniture” (Harrison 
1951, 39). Then when the Board went to sell the equipment, they cut into a secure levy to get it 
out of the canal it was in, and with the boat removed, they realized the funds were not available 
to fix the levee properly. The soft spot in the levee that remained later caused a breech and 
extensive damage to the neighboring landowners' property (Harrison 1951). Because of scandals 
and inefficiencies like these, drainage districts quickly fell into disrepute after their creation. 
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 Clearly over their heads in what proved to be a complex and difficult position managing 
the drainage districts, things remained unchanged for several years. The Board was building and 
maintaining levees for flood control, and only tenuously accomplishing it at best, as big floods in 
1856 and 1858 severely hampered many early projects. The 1858 floods wiped out 20% of the 
state's sugar crop, with many of the levees incapacitated by the floods two years before 
(Sitterson 1953). After that, the Board made plans to build more levees, closing off more wetland 
territory assuming they would still help control flooding. These plans were opposed by State 
Engineer Louis Hebert who contested that keeping some wetlands in a natural state was 
important to the state's flood management plan, echoing the sentiments of Ellet nine years 
earlier. The Board argued that their funds were appropriated with the primary purpose to protect 
from flooding and that levees were the best way to accomplish that. The state legislature and 
public agreed with the Board, so once again the “levees-only” policy persisted (Harrison 1951).  
 Despite their apparent inadequacies, the people of Louisiana wanted even more out of 
their Board of Swamp Land Commissioners. They cited the SLA saying that the state was 
supposed to facilitate drainage of the wetlands, rendering the land not just protected from floods, 
but also arable and safe for construction so landowners could better use the land that they paid 
for (Cowdrey 1977). The demands on the Board far exceeded what they had been able to 
accomplish in the first decade of their existence, and little progress would occur over the next 
decade during the Civil War. With the war consuming many of the state's resources, work on 
flood and drainage projects ground to a halt during the 1860s. In just Louisiana, more than 107 
miles of levees were destroyed during the civil war (McCorvie and Lant 1993) 
 Outside of Louisiana and the lower Mississippi in the Midwest, wetlands were managed 
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slightly differently. Glaciers from the last ice age left much of the Midwest flat and poorly 
drained, resulting in many wetlands throughout. In much of Indiana and Illinois, European-
american settlements predated the federal swampland grants, and in many cases farmers 
reclaimed wetlands themselves by digging ditches and building dikes (Prince 1997). This was 
done so extensively that in 1845, when swampland legislation was being discussed nationally, an 
Indiana farm journal wrote that “many farmers have already more arable land than they can till 
to advantage” (quoted in Strausberg 1977, 192), implying that no drainage assistance or 
legislation was needed in Indiana. But with the 1850 Swampland Act, along with several other 
Midwestern states, Indiana and Illinois were granted 1.3 and 1.5 million acres of swampland, 
respectively (Prince 1997). Indiana's administration of their granted swamplands differed 
slightly from Louisiana's, but as was the case for all of the original 1850 swampland grant states, 
the result was the same: the state government attempted to form some administrative body, such 
as a drainage district or swampland commission, then, due to lack of oversight, corrupt board 
members, and fraudulent land dealings, the administration soon went bankrupt with no money to 
maintain their levees, let alone build new ones (Vileisis 1997). 
 
E. Technology and a new era for drainage 
 As the war progressed, flooding continued and drainage projects failed. And in1869, 
there became less land protected from flood waters than had been in 1854 (Harrison 1951). And 
in 1872, the commissioner of the GLO declared the swampland grants a failure. The floods of 
the late 1850s and the civil war had left the drainage districts broke and their levees in disrepair 
(Weaver 1964). It is easy to blame the boards of commissioners for the failure of the grant 
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program, but the single most significant factor responsible for the failure was that the 
engineering technology just had not existed yet to make wetland drainage a profitable enterprise. 
This would change in the last quarter of the century as the industrial revolution led to the large 
scale mechanization of the entire American economy, and perhaps the most important piece was 
the steam-powered engine. Steam-powered machines like dredges, mill saws, bulldozers, and 
ditch-diggers were soon altering landscapes on enormous scales.  
 It is worth noting that the original swampland grants were not a complete disaster. 
Although they never realized their intended goals of draining swamps and creating more 
accessible, developable, and cultivable land, the grants were a critical first step toward those 
goals in the larger trajectory of American wetland reclamation. The grants also forced engineers 
and legislators to break new ground in thinking about how to control these landscapes both 
physically and politically. The swampland grants were the first iteration of an ongoing trial and 
error process in wetland management—they tried and failed, but they would soon return with 
bigger and better tools.  
 The first technological innovation that 
changed wetland drainage potential was tiling. 
Advances in ceramic production technology 
facilitated the use of u-shaped tiles (Fig. 5) that, 
when inverted on one another and buried 
underground, functioned like perforated pipe, 
draining saturated soils to a ditch outlet. This 
Fig. 5: Ceramic drainage tiles used to shunt 
water away from saturated soils revolutionized 
land drainage in the nineteenth century. 
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technology was invented and used in Scotland in the early nineteenth century, but implemented 
in 1835 by Scottish immigrant farmer John Johnston in Geneva, New York by the Erie Canal 
(Weaver 1964). He imported plans for tiles and originally had them all produced by hand, then 
by a crude tile-molding machine. The tiles were then set into hand-dug ditches, making the 
process too expensive for large scale implementation. But by 1851, Johnston had laid sixteen 
miles of tiled ditches on his land and while most people thought he was crazy, the number of 
believers was growing with his own land a testament to the effectiveness of tiles (Weaver 1964). 
A new tile machine was imported from England and production costs were cut in half, and 
within a decade, there were twelve new tile manufacturers within a ten mile radius of Johnston's 
farm. With the popularity of tiling sky-rocketing in the 1860s, the technology spread rapidly 
across the Midwestern and Southern states, and with steam-powered tile machines pumping out 
two thousand miles of drain tiles annually, they only got cheaper and more accessible for farmers 
(Beauchamp 1987). To compound the benefit of technology in tile production, ditch-digging 
went from hand-dug to horse-drawn machines in the 1850s, steam-powered in 1892, and 
gasoline-powered in 1908. Technology was rapidly changing the face of wetland drainage, and 
therefore wetlands themselves (Weaver 1964). 
 Until this point, tiled ditches primarily benefited the farmers and landowners in draining 
their wet fields, but those ditches had to terminate in some sort of public drainage outlet, usually 
a canal or river. The innovation of steam powered dredges and excavators in the late 1890s 
dramatically changed this public end of drainage. Suddenly, massive amounts of material could 
be moved by a couple people operating a dredge (Fig. 6) or excavator, revolutionizing levee and 
canal building but also river navigation. For the first time dredges could scoop sediments from 
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the bottom of rivers and lakes to excavate the channel, deepening it for ship passage or to 
effectively increase the channel capacity for flood control. The latter being the priority for public 
drainage projects, dredges and excavators would be the most important piece of technology for 
drainage districts for the first two decades of the twentieth century, the peak of drainage district 
formation, levee building, and subsequent wetland drainage and development (Prince 1997). 
 
 
F. Evolution of the drainage district 
 As farmers found a way to drain their land with tiles, they now looked for a public 
drainage outlet. The drainage districts of the 1850s had been abandoned in the early 1870s and 
categorized as a legislative failure. The districts as a concept would essentially lay inactive for 
the next decade while technology progressed and spread throughout the country. This was a 
critical dormant period for the districts as it gave them a chance to develop more organically, as 
Fig. 6: Early steam-powered dredge 
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a response to the need for a public drainage outlet. Because the cost of building such drainage 
outlets was still too high for an average individual landowner to finance, communities of farmers 
came together for large-scale projects (Prince 1997). The existing laws did not allow landowners 
to organize and build these drainage projects on their own, so states passed new statutes that 
made room for what would become the modern incarnation of the drainage district. The biggest 
change that these statutes included was that they allowed drainage districts to tax landowners in 
order to pay for drainage projects and maintenance. They also gave districts the right to use 
eminent domain to acquire property for their projects, granted that their projects “outweigh the 
costs and serve public health, welfare, and utility” (McCorvie and Lant 1993, 36). 
 This time, however, since most of the land was privately owned, the laws were passed 
but the districts were not established until farmers in a given watershed and community 
assembled and petitioned for a district (McCorvie and Lant 1993). State by state, the country 
gradually passed these laws allowing the formation of drainage districts with few variations 
between states. Oregon was an early adopter, passing their drainage law in 1868, and was just 
the third state to do so behind Michigan and Ohio. By 1900, drainage districts had been widely 
accepted, as twelve more states passed this drainage legislation between 1870 and 1900, as land 
value of drained lands often rose nearly five hundred percent (Williams 1993). 
 The first three decades of the twentieth century were the peak of drainage district 
formation and activity. Sixty percent of the total drained land in the country had been drained 
between 1900 and 1919 (Pavelis 1987). The economy was booming during this era as the 
climate shifted into a wetter than average cycle for over a decade and farm prices rose. Twenty-
three more states would pass drainage legislation by 1930, and the 1920 census reported that 
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drainage districts accounted for over sixty-six million acres of poorly-drained land (Pavelis 
1987). The success of drainage districts began with technological innovation, but it was only 
realized with the new laws that allowed communities of farmers and landowners to organize, 
plan, raise revenue, and hire the engineers to accomplish the drainage.  
 
H. Ducks vs. Dredges: U.S. drainage policy through the 1950s 
 The federal government was not completely out of the drainage market during the boom 
era of the districts. The Reclamation Act of 1902 granted some land reclamation power back to 
the federal government, whereas the Swampland Act had largely transferred the power to 
reclaim land from the national to the state and local level. The Reclamation Act created the 
Bureau of Reclamation housed in the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and was responsible 
for administering land reclamation projects, mostly dam-building, and initially only to 
investigate some regulatory aspects of wetland drainage, such as alkali damage due to irrigation 
seepage (Vileisis 1997). Two years later, the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering (BAE), also in 
the USDA, assumed responsibility for all things related to agricultural drainage (Beauchamp 
1987). 
While the federal government was actively working to drain wetlands on a large scale, a 
law was passed that would later prove to be instrumental in the federal protection of wetlands as 
bird habitat. The Migratory Bird Act of 1913 superseded states’ rights and gave the federal 
government primary jurisdiction over migratory birds. Wetlands serve a vital role for migratory 
birds, as they provide expansive shallow sloughs and lakes with food and space for large flocks 
(Bean 1977). With federal jurisdiction over migratory birds, President Wilson signed the 
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Migratory Bird Treaty with Canada in 1916. This would later require the government to preserve 
wetland bird habitat in order to uphold treaty obligations when wetlands were fragmented and 
destroyed by way of drainage (Trefethan 1975).  
 During the late 1920s and 1930s, drainage districts and their projects took a hit with the 
busting economy. Drainage districts found themselves without a tax base as landowners could 
not pay their bills, and so drainage projects were slowed if not altogether abandoned due to lack 
of funding (Pavelis 1987). Then in 1935, congress approved drainage and irrigation districts to 
receive assistance from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to help fund operations. 
The RFC was an independent federal agency created in 1932 to support lending to state and local 
governments, banks, railroads, mortgage associations, and other businesses. The RFC is largely 
considered a success, lending a cumulative total of two billion dollars in its twenty-five year 
existence, most of which was successfully repaid. And for drainage districts it was a godsend, 
allowing districts who were particularly struggling in twenty-six states to continue operations 
when they may have otherwise not been able to (O’neill 2006).  
Similarly, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was another way drainage districts 
benefited from New Deal legislation (Fig. 7). In 1935, the BAE became responsible for forty-six 
CCC camps working on state-led drainage projects. The CCC provided essential free labor for 
many drainage districts building flood control projects, and in turn, the districts put a lot of 
people to work building levees that would serve the cities through flood risk reduction 
(Beauchamp 1987). These and other programs run by the federal and state governments allowed 
drainage projects to continue despite the economic downturn (Vileisis 1997) 
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Fig. 7: WPA crews building a levee in York, PA (March, 1936) 
 
 
But by the 1930s, the negative effects of drainage on wildlife were beginning to be more 
well-known (Fig. 8). The depression led people to hunt and fish for food, often ignoring bag 
limits, which then led to significant declines in many wetland species, but especially waterfowl 
(Kallman 1987). As a result, President Franklin Roosevelt created a special Committee on 
Wildlife Restoration which established Wildlife Refuges as a means of restoring habitat for 
waterfowl. With little to no money available for land acquisition, the Migratory Bird Hunting 
Stamp Act of 1934 authorized the sale of $1 stamps to raise money for refuge acquisition 
(Kallman 1987). This was the first program that raised funds for refuges, but the stamps alone 
were not enough. Over the next several years, Congress passed laws that ensured hunting fees 
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and firearm and munitions taxes were allocated to refuges, raising more money. Additionally, 
clubs like Ducks Unlimited and More Game Birds in America worked to fill the gaps of state 
and federal funding (Kallman 1987). These citizen groups were primarily composed of 
waterfowl hunters who experienced the declining wetland conditions through their hobby and 
sought to better wetland habitat, albeit in self-interest. A healthier wetland ecosystem supports 
more and healthier waterfowl, which means there’s more and better quality waterfowl to hunt 
and eat. Groups like these are important to the history of conservation because they typically 
have considerable resources to employ towards lobbying, conservation projects, and land 
acquisition (Tori et al 2002; Geist, Mahoney, and Organ 2001).  
Fig. 8: Darling, Jay N. Drying Up Wildlife. 1937. Editorial 
cartoon. http://lib.uiowa.edu/collguides/?MSC0170 
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After the war, with soldiers returning home and the economy in high gear, the federal 
government increased drainage assistance programs like the USDA-administed Agriculture 
Conservation Program and the Soil Conservation Service’s technical assistance program, 
offering free engineering assistance for new drainage projects (Errington 1957). Draining 
wetlands was still considered to be “conserving” the agricultural integrity of the of the soil, and 
so the federal government pushed drainage hard. 
In the early 1950s, using duck stamp revenue, the Fish and Wildlife Service began 
collecting survey data on wetlands to track the quantity and quality of migratory bird habitat 
across the country. The survey was published in 1956 and detailed an estimated loss of forty-five 
million acres of native wetland habitat to “other uses” (Shaw and Fredine 1956).  In 1958, 
Congress responded by approving the Wetlands Easement Program, also funded by duck stamp 
money, to protect important privately owned waterfowl breeding areas, and recommending 
changes to USDA regulations in subsidizing farm drainage. The USDA failed to make regulatory 
changes until 1963 with the passing of the Agricultural Appropriations Act that prohibited the 
use of federal funds for cost sharing and technical assistance to drain all inland freshwater 
wetlands (Kallman 1987). 
Federally subsidized wetland drainage ended because habitat for migratory and game 
birds had been severely compromised, making the Migratory Bird Act of 1913 one of the most 
important pieces of legislation for the conservation of wetlands. Environmental conservation 
across the board, not just wetland conservation, was gaining traction in the late 1950s and into 
the 1960s. In the same era as Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), Errington wrote Of Marshes and 
Men (1957) which spoke out against the drainage and development that was destroying wetland 
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ecosystems across the country. Leopold’s “Marshland Elegy” (1948), like Errington (1957), 
stemmed from the loss of Midwestern wetlands, and was written ten years earlier, mourning the 
fragile state of the crane in Wisconsin wetlands. These works were important contributions to the 
shift in perception of wetlands, as they helped to construct the idea of wetlands as a precious 
landscape in the American mind (Prince 1997). Americans were changing their attitude toward 
wetlands, and the environmental laws of the 1960s and 1970s would eventually become the 
cornerstone of wetland management in the twenty-first century. 
 
I. Environmental legislation 
Three monumental environmental laws were created in the late 1960s and 1970s that 
provided the tools to attack private and public projects that were considered to be harmful to the 
environment: the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species 
Act. The federal government didn’t have the resources to enforce these laws on a wide scale, so 
citizen groups evolved as the de facto watchdog for projects that violated these laws, a dynamic 
that has become the very structure of the U.S. environmental protection program (Vileisis 1997). 
Despite this “all stick and no carrot” approach, citizen groups have had considerable success 
employing these laws to discourage further loss of wetlands. 
 
National Environmental Policy Act 
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), requiring all 
federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their projects before work began in an 
environmental impact statement. A comment period was built into the approval process for 
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citizen groups and other agencies to voice their concerns about the project. This was important 
because just like Ducks Unlimited and others had done thirty years prior, citizen groups now had 
a forum and a role built into the approval process.  
 
Clean Water Act 
 In 1972, as public awareness of pollution and especially water pollution reached its 
zenith, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was passed, more commonly known as the Clean 
Water Act (CWA). To curb pollution, this law was created to regulate discharge into almost any 
waterway in the country. Under Section 404, the law transferred ownership of all wetlands to the 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), who are responsible for managing the nation’s navigable 
channels. Because of their history and obligation to maintain shipping channels, controversy 
ensued over whether the USACE wetlands were beholden to the same regulations under the 
CWA. Citizen groups used litigation to strong-arm the USACE into adopting the CWA 
regulations, which they did in 1975 (Blumm and Zahela 1989; Stine 1983). 
 
Endangered Species Act 
 Passed in 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was created to protect species from 
going extinct. What made this law powerful, however, was that it protected the endangered 
species’ habitat from destruction, and wetlands provide critical habitat to many endangered 
species (Nelson 1985). The effect of this law meant that federal agencies and others had to 
accommodate endangered species habitat 
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Prioritizing wetlands in the 1980s and 1990s 
 During the 1970s, the field of wetland science grew considerably. Conferences and 
professional organizations of wetland scientists gained nationwide acceptance. In 1974, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service started the National Wetlands Inventory (NWI), a project aimed at updating 
the FWS wetlands survey from the 1950s. Their results were published in 1983, revealing that 
over nine million acres of wetlands had been lost in twenty years, and 87% were accounted for 
by agriculture (Tiner 1984). 
 Just as the results of the first wetlands inventory had stoked federal action by way of 
ending drainage projects, so did the NWI. In 1986, the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act 
(EWRA) was approved to address the wetlands crisis. The law focused on acquisition of 
wetlands; paying landowners for their land avoided having to regulate their activity Funding 
came from an extension to the Wetlands Loan Act, which allowed the FWS to borrow against 
future duck stamp revenue. Additionally, EWRA required the NWI to publish a new survey 
every ten years to keep a closer eye on the status of wetlands in the U.S (Prince 1997). 
 Good things kept coming for wetlands in the 1980s. The 1985 Food Securities Act, also 
called the “Farm Bill” and deemed “Swampbuster,” eliminated subsides for farmers who 
“busted” up wetlands to farm them. This effectively addressed the ongoing budget crisis of the 
farm subsidy program and the hemorrhaging of wetland habitat by discouraging wetland 
drainage with the threat of subsidy loss. Unfortunately, however, enforcement proved difficult. 
The Farm Bill was reauthorized in 1990, adding the Wetlands Reserve Program (changed to the 
Agricultural Conservation Easement in the 2014 reauthorization), which pays landowners to 
restore their land back to a natural wetland (Vileisis 1997).  
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 In 1991, President George Bush instituted the “no net loss” policy, the product of a year 
and a half long National Wetlands Policy Forum. The forum consisted of twenty representatives 
from a divergent array of often competing interests in wetlands (e.g. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, National Association of Homebuilders), and was organized 
to come up with a wetlands policy that they could all agree on. The result was no net loss, which 
then presidential candidate George Bush adopted as part of his campaign platform (Babcock 
1990). No net loss meant that no wetlands could be lost from any proposed project. So, naturally, 
the debate began over how to define a wetland. Through several iterations of definitions from 
several different agencies, exhaustive debate, and continued regulatory confusion over what 
constitutes a wetland and how it should be accounted for, political stalemate set in. Bush’s term 
ended before the No Net Loss wetland policy he had championed during his campaign could 
really take effect (Lewis 2001). 
 In 1993, President Clinton ended the divisive debate over federal wetlands policy. He 
reestablished no net loss of wetlands and threw a bone to all of its opponents, offering 
exemptions to the CWA for fifty-three million acres of converted wetlands, endorsing mitigation 
banking (compensatory offsite wetland conservation) for projects that violate the CWA, and 
continued support for wetlands restoration (Lewis 2001). Clinton’s No Net Loss policy was 
considered a diplomatic move since all sides benefited slightly and no one group was satisfied 
(Blumm 1993; Lewis 2001; Vileisis 1997).  
 Debate over wetlands, how to account for them, and how to conserve them has persisted 
since the Swampland Act of 1849. Competing priorities of citizens, states, and federal agencies 
complicate the process of forming an overarching wetland policy that addresses conservation 
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and the economic use of the landscape. The Swampbuster was reauthorized in 2014 with no 
changes to the regulations, despite continued known violation (GAO 2003). Wetland losses 
continue, albeit at a slowed pace (Fig. 9), and the debate over the effectiveness of mitigation 
banking as a conservation measure continues as well (Levrel 2017). 
 The rate of wetland depletion at the national level is one way to measure shifting 
attitudes toward wetlands over time. At this scale, changes in federal wetland management 
correlate with a reduction in the rate of wetland depletion nationwide (Fig. 9).  But what about 
the local scale? Can changes in these wetland landscapes at the city-wide scale be observed to 
correlate with shifting attitudes? Using the Columbia Slough as a case study, I examine how the 
landscape has evolved to reflect these cultural values.  
 
Fig. 9: Average annual wetland loss since the first wetland survey in the 1950s 
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II. The Columbia Slough 
 The first human use of the Slough was by American Indians. In 1805, the Lewis and 
Clark Corps of Discovery came down the Columbia River and explored the Columbia Slough, 
noting the Ne-cha-co-lee village of the Multnomah Chinook tribe (Thwaites 2001). The village 
occupied the present day site of Blue Lake Park and served as a seasonal village for hunting, 
fishing, and other cultural celebrations (Metro 2015). 
The Hudson Bay Company and North West Company trapped extensively in the Slough 
until 1820, shipping the furs back east and even as far as England (Fairview 1992).  The rest of 
the nineteenth century saw the settling of the Slough, with agriculture comprising most of the 
land use throughout the watershed. Until the twentieth century when the Multnomah County 
Drainage District would be established, each farm was in charge of their own drainage projects, 
including the use of drainage tiles in parts of the watershed (Stroud 1995). 
 
A. The early 20th century Slough 
 While wetland drainage progressed in the rest of the country, Portland found itself poised 
to take full advantage of the new technology and government programs to expand their 
developable real estate into the nearby Columbia Slough watershed. The Great Flood of 1894 
caused extensive damage in downtown Portland and the lower Willamette areas. This instilled 
Portlanders with a fear of flooding that would resonate throughout the region with the 
construction of the Columbia Slough levee system, thereby dramatically altering the landscape 
for the foreseeable future (MacColl 1979).  
John Charles Olmsted, step brother of the renowned Frederik Law Olmsted who designed 
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Central Park and many other exalted public spaces in the country, submitted a parks plan to the 
City of Portland in 1903. The plan included an interconnected network of greenspace across the 
entire city, and highlighted an expansive meadow park in the Columbia Slough. Unfortunately, 
the plan was not accepted and the park was never built (Orloff 2004).  
 In 1907, the watershed began experiencing the first of what would be a long history of 
industrial use. The Seattle Portland and Spokane Railroad built their rail line through the Slough 
adjacent to Smith and Bybee Lakes. Stockyards and meat packing plants soon opened in the 
watershed following the lucrative transportation route (MacColl 1988). Transportation is one of 
the most important concepts of how the Columbia Slough has become the regional economic 
center it is today. The flat flood-forged landscape has made it highly conducive to transportation 
by rail, ship, automobile, and air. Accessibility, geographic situation, and location on the 
periphery of Portland makes the Slough very attractive for companies to locate their facilities—
especially industrial businesses that manufacture and move goods. 
 
B. Columbia Slough drainage districts are established 
 The creation of the drainage districts in the Slough begins with James O. Elrod, a farmer 
turned real estate developer and capitalist who moved to Portland in 1905. After his arrival, 
Elrod quickly made friends with local bankers and businessmen, whom he called upon when 
proposing the Multnomah Drainage District in 1918 (MacColl 1979). Elrod saw the success of 
the expansive Sun Dial Ranch in the eastern part of the watershed, which supplied many of the 
local towns and communities with beef and pork products (Fairview 1992). To accomplish this, 
the Sun Dial Ranch had diked and drained much of its land to raise stock. Elrod’s friends were 
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affiliated with the United States Employment Service, a national organization dedicated to 
finding employment for returning servicemen, and he thought that by establishing this drainage 
district, he could open up 8,000 acres of farmland to put unemployed servicemen to work after 
the war ended (MacColl 1979). In 1918, Elrod’s proposal for the district to the State of Oregon 
included his stated intentions as such:  
(T)he sole object of the proposed district improvement is to make 
productive by creating conditions favorable to its full use for agricultural 
purposes…Such an improvement will be an aid to the development of the 
enclosed and adjacent lands for industrial and commercial purposes and 
can in no way interfere with such development. (MCDD 1918) 
 
 Elrod made the argument for “taking advantage of the higher land in the east of their 
district” to build a canal with a gate at the western end of their district, and making it possible to 
simply purge their section of the Slough by pumping water through the canal back to the 
Columbia River. By doing this, Elrod thought water quality would improve by allowing fresh 
water to flow through the Slough (MCDD 1918). The City Canal (now called the Peninsula 
Canal) was completed in 1919 and would ultimately be considered a failure and rendered 
inoperable in 1948 after the Vanport Flood ravaged the entire levee system. Damming the 
Slough at the west end of the drainage district trapped industrial waste and water quality 
worsened as the intended purging through the canal never worked as planned (Stroud 1995). The 
canal now sits unused as a long and narrow lake between the Slough and the river, inaccessible 
due to the tall steep dike walls on both sides.  
  Pemberton 46 
 The Multnomah Drainage District
2
 (MDD) was established in 1918, establishing Elrod as 
president. He immediately went to work gaining approval from the Port of Portland and the 
Army Corps of Engineers to build two dams on the Columbia Slough as he outlined in his 
proposal letter (MacColl 1979). Beyond approval, Elrod needed to raise funds for his project. In 
his proposal, he quotes the project at a cost of thirty-five cents per acre to “maximize the utility 
of the land for agriculture and industrial development” (MCDD 1918). Fortunately, one year 
prior, the Oregon Legislature created the Irrigation and Drainage Securities Commission to 
certify irrigation and drainage bonds as legal instruments for trust funds. In 1919, the MDD 
raised $600,000 through bond sales for its construction projects. Additionally, Elrod drew on his 
co-investors in the North Pacific Lumber Company and received federal funds by way of the 
Sinnot Bill
3
, which allocated $113 million to reclamation projects (MacColl 1979). 
 By 1921, the Portland Telegram reported that the MDD has already generated $3.5 
million for the county and its inhabitants, and that farm production was up by more than 50 
percent (MacColl 1979). But agricultural land sales began to taper off in the mid-1920s and all 
but ceased during the depression. The 1920s brought with it other industrial development in the 
Slough. Lumber and wood products companies, such as the Kenton Shingle Company and 
Kenwood Lumber Company opened in the lower stretch of the Slough where tugboats would 
move log rafts in and out of the Slough where the companies operated from. By the 1930s and 
1940s, as many as eleven lumber and shingle companies would be operating in the watershed. 
(Fig10) 
                                                 
2
 The name of the Multnomah Drainage District was later changed to “Multnomah County Drainage District” 
(MCDD) at a date unknown. The two are used interchangeably in this paper. 
3
 Representative Nicholas Sinnott from The Dalles was a long-time friend of the Elrod family (MacColl 1979). 
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 During the depression, the MDD received help from the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation loans that were created as part of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation to help 
reclamation projects stay afloat (MacColl 1979). By 1935, 7,000 acres were planted in crops and 
nearly 900 farmers were living within the MDD boundaries (Oregon 1935). This was the peak of 
farming in the Slough, as World War II would have two different effects on the landscape: 
industrialization and housing. 
 Shipping and industrial development ramped up during the war years, putting the MDD 
in premium position to drain its remaining wetlands and capitalize on its accessibility, situation, 
Fig. 10: Commercial log raft in the Slough around 1940. 
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and location. Along with industry, nearby housing for employees was needed, so communities 
like the 650-acre Vanport were built to support the growing demand for affordable housing near 
factories. In the mid-1930s, the Port of Portland acquired 700 acres of farmland in the middle of 
the MDD for construction of a new international airport (Lansing 2003). With that, came 
warehouses and distribution facilities to transfer goods throughout the region. Through all of 
this, the landscape was changing. What developers like Elrod initially saw as farmland potential 
in the Slough, they now saw greater, more lucrative potential in industrial and commercial 
development. 
After the war, much of Elrod’s drainage district began transitioning from farmland to 
commercial, recreational, and residential developments. Golf courses and subdivisions were 
replacing large tracts of farmland; Elrod himself owned two private golf courses in the Slough 
(MacColl1979). The view of the Sloughscape was shifting, but this change was not due to 
changing cultural values, but just simply improving economic potential. The respective 
conversions of wetland to farmland and farmland to industrial, commercial, and residential land 
are driven by the same function: economic potential. The values of citizens and those in power 
over the Slough still saw the landscape as something to be used and employed as a means to 
make money.  
 
C. Testing the levees 
 Flood control is considered as one of the primary reasons levees are built. In their century 
of existence, the MCDD levees have been tested four times, each event serving as a knick point 
for change in modifying and improving the levee system; unfortunately, the levees have only 
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passed three of those four tests. The first true test came in June of 1933, fifteen years after their 
construction, when the Columbia River rose thirty-two feet during a late spring flood (Maben 
1987). The levees successfully held back the flood waters and their permanence in the collective 
public mind only solidified. The next major flood event would not be such a success. Another 




 Several historians and other social scientists have written about the 1948 flooding and 
subsequent destruction of the city of Vanport, the nation's largest wartime housing development, 
as it is considered to be one of Oregon's biggest natural disasters (McGregor 2003; McElderry 
1998; Maben 1987; Rivera and Miller 2007). The story of Vanport has become a legendary tale 
of environmental injustice and catastrophic urban planning, caused by the failure of a MCDD 
levee during a spring high water event in 1948 (Stroud 1999). The town was built to help quell 
Portland's housing crisis caused by the major influx of workers immigrating to Portland for the 
many available jobs in the shipyards. Unfortunately, Vanport was built on 650 acres north of 
Denver Avenue and east of the Northern Pacific Rail line levee, the present day site of Delta 
Park, Portland International Raceway, and Heron Lakes Golf Course. At its peak in 1944, 
Vanport was estimated to house 42,000 people, but population waned toward the end of the war. 
After the war, the resident population became increasingly African American and the town 
developed a reputation for housing people on welfare and high crime rates, despite the fact crime 
rates were not significantly different from the rest of the city of Portland (Stroud 1999). Vanport 
  Pemberton 50 
was thought of as a “great headache” and a “municipal monstrosity” by then Portland mayor 
Earl Riley, exemplifying the general attitude of many Portland residents toward Vanport (Maben 
1987).  
On May 30, 1948, the Columbia River rose to fifteen feet above its flood plain, contained 
only by its dikes, and broke through the North Pacific Railroad embankment bordering the west 
side of Vanport (Fig. 11). The town 
flooded quickly, washing away vehicles 
and the thin wooden apartment 
structures housing 18,000 people. 
Fifteen people died in the flood and the 
entire city of Vanport was wiped from 
the map, being completely destroyed 
and never rebuilt, displacing those 
18,000 people, most of whom were 
minorities (McGregor 2003). The 
Vanport Flood became another chapter 
of the larger history of racial prejudice 
in Portland (Stroud 1999), but only 
because a levee was breached. This 
tragedy did not bring pause for city 
officials to consider the risks of building in a wetland, but only encouraged them to build higher, 
stronger levees. After the flood, the levees were rebuilt higher and reinforced across the system, 
Fig. 11: Aerial photo of flooded Vanport at the site of the 
breach (looking south toward Portland)  
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this time to survive a 100-year flood event (Maben 1987).  
 
1964 and 1996 Floods 
 Sixteen years after Vanport, the Christmas Day Flood of 1964 tested the levees once 
again. The flood severely damaged crops throughout the Willamette Valley as the Willamette 
River swelled, but the MCDD levees did their job and held back the floodwaters of the 
Columbia (Abbott 2001). This flood spurred the conception and construction of the mid-dike 
levee at NE 142
nd
 Ave (MCDD 2016), which provides further flood protection by separating the 
middle and upper Slough . The 1996 flood caused some damage by way of erosion on many of 
the levees, but no major failures or levee breaches occurred to the extent they had in 1948. 
However, in the same area that once housed Vanport, the levee adjacent to the Portland 
International Raceway experienced significant movement and emergency repairs were required 
to keep it from washing out (MCDD 2016). This was the closest the levees have come to 
breaching as they had in 1948, and to enhance the interoperability and cooperation of the four 
districts. After the 1996 flood the MCDD took over administration of the four districts in the 
Slough, citing the need for centralized administration during emergencies and cohesive operation 
as a single system of levees (MCDD 2016). 
 
D. The drained landscape becomes a regional economic center 
 The growth of a place and the development of its economical or political power depend 
largely on its geographic situation and its accessibility (Taafe et al. 1996). Once drained, the 
Columbia Slough landscape became extremely accessible. Its situation at the confluence of two 
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major rivers, proximity to Portland, and low relief made it an excellent place for Portland to 
expand its economy.  
In 1891, the Oregon Legislature established the Port of Portland to create and maintain a 
navigable shipping channel to a depth of twenty-five feet from downtown Portland on the 
Willamette River, up the Columbia River to the Pacific Ocean (MacColl 1988). The Port did 
little in the Slough through its first eighty years of existence, as they primarily were in charge of 
dredging and working with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to make sure 
ships could reach Portland. Portlanders soon realized that private railroads and corporations were 
quickly buying up all the waterfront property in town; this was concerning to people as they saw 
it impinging access for shipping and reducing the economic potential of the city. As a result, in 
1910 citizens of Portland approved the spending of $500,000 to purchase waterfront property for 
public docks. However, then Mayor Joseph Simon, who was considered to have ties with the 
railroad, vetoed the ordinance. But voters came right back, using a new initiative process, to 
approve $2.5 million ($60.3 million in 2016 dollars) and create a Commission of Public Docks, 
side-stepping the Mayor and breaking up the railroad monopoly. The commission opened their 
first dock, called Terminal 1, in 1913 (Lansing 2003).   
 
Shipping Terminals 
 Five more terminals would be built over the next seventy years, with Terminal 1 
demolished in 1932 to make way for the St. John's Bridge, and Terminal 3 at Washington Street 
being similarly demolished for the Marquam Bridge in the 1960s (MacColl 1979). Terminals 5 
and 6, built in the 1970s, fall within the Columbia Slough watershed and are associated with the 
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Rivergate Industrial District, a Port property adjacent to the terminals. The Port's terminals are 
immensely important to the economy of Portland and the surrounding region as they are 
necessary for all of the overseas importing and exporting of the area. They allow ships to offload 
their cargo and send it anywhere in the region by plane, train, truck, and other ships going up the 
Willamette and Columbia rivers. The Slough's geography as a flat flood plain allows this 
regional economic center to function, making it an ideal location to receive goods by many 
modes of transportation and then distribute them throughout the region. 
 
Airports 
 The Port of Portland would become a big player in the Columbia Slough over the next 
hundred years, merging with the Commission of Public Docks in 1970, and establishing several 
assets in the watershed that have become the framework for the economic development that 
dominates Columbia Slough land use today. The Port completed the city's first airport in 1927 on 
Swan Island after acquiring it in 1921. The island was a true island initially and the main channel 
of the Willamette River went along the east side of the island, but with the use of the new 
dredging technology, the Port immediately began dredging the west side of the island, shifting 
the river's main channel and allowing the island to be connected to the east bank (MacCol 1979). 
By the mid-1930s, larger passenger and cargo aircraft demanded longer landing strips than what 
Swan Island could offer, so the Port began construction on the Portland-Columbia Airport, later 
renamed as the Portland International Airport, located squarely in the center of the then newly-
leveed Columbia Slough watershed (Abbott 2001). Using money from the city of Portland, the 
federal WPA program, and the Port, the airport was completed in 1940. It was built on 700 acres 
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bordering the Columbia River to the north and the Columbia Slough to the south, and was 
expanded in 1959 by one runway and a terminal, and then doubled in size in 1977 to roughly its 
current state (MacColl 1979). In 1942, the Port also purchased the 284-acre Troutdale Airport 
located toward the eastern end of the watershed; however it is a much smaller airport serving 
flight schools, light cargo, and private aviators. 
 
Other Properties 
 Airports have been an important piece of the Port's portfolio, providing air transportation 
for the entire Portland Metro area as Oregon's largest and the Northwest’s second largest airport. 
But the Port's activity in the Slough reaches further yet beyond airports and marine terminals. 
Other Port properties include the Rivergate Industrial District, the Portland International Center, 
Cascade Station, Air Cargo, the Gresham Vista Business Park and the Troutdale-Reynolds 
Industrial Park. These properties account for 4,000 total acres of commercial and industrial 
development near the largest transportation arteries in the region, including the Union Pacific 
and BNSF railroads, Portland International Airport, two marine terminals, and three interstate 
freeways in I-5, I-205, and I-84. These properties are owned by the Port and are leased to 
businesses wishing to operate in close proximity to shipping and transportation centers (Port of 
Portland 2013).  
 Not only is the Port a major regional economic center by way of its capacity to receive 
and distribute goods throughout the region, transport people to all parts of the world, and provide 
spaces for businesses to operate in close proximity to these transportation resources, but it is also 
directly and indirectly responsible for over 40,000 jobs located in the Columbia Slough 
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watershed. Together, these factors make the Slough a highly valuable economic asset to the city 
of Portland and the region. The Port alone is directly and indirectly responsible for billions of 
dollars changing hands in the watershed between imports and exports, goods transportation and 
distribution, human transportation, businesses manufacturing and selling products and materials, 
and jobs (Port of Portland 2013). 
 
E. The natural landscape in an industrial sanctuary 
 The naturally flat topography of the flood plain that is the Columbia Slough has had two 
effects on the story of the human use of its landscape. Firstly, because the Slough's terrain is flat 
and stretches a considerable distance from east to west, it is highly conducive to being a 
transportation thoroughfare by many modes. Excellent transportation and close proximity to the 
Portland metropolitan area makes it an ideal location for mineral and materials manufacturing 
facilities, warehouses, storage facilities, distribution centers, and other businesses (Abbott 2001).  
These types of operations created a lot of pollution that would go unchecked until the 1970s with 
the passing of the Clean Water Act, and because the Slough's topography is so flat and the 
MCDD's levees and dikes prevent the seasonal floods that would usually flush the system, the 
effluent from these facilities would stay put and would not flow downstream. Hence, the 
Slough's waterways became highly polluted soon after industrial use of the landscape began, 
with stockyards and lumbermills discharging their waste directly into the Slough (Abbot 2001).  
The ecological health of the Slough would continue this negative trend until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s when the City of Portland began implementing certain policies and regulations to 
protect the “natural and manmade” features of the Columbia Slough. This would all come to a 
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head in 1991 with the closure of the St. John's Landfill, a landmark victory for the St. Johns 
community and for the broader efforts of citizens working to preserve natural space throughout 
the Columbia Slough watershed.  
 
The first legally protected natural areas in the Slough 
 In 1987, the City of Portland developed the Columbia South Shore Plan District, which 
created zones within the Columbia Slough watershed to “protect, conserve, enhance, restore, and 
maintain significant natural and manmade features of public value, including river corridors, 
streams, lakes and islands, domestic water supply watersheds, flood water storage areas, natural 
shorelines and unique vegetation, wildlife and fish habitats, significant geological features..." 
(Portland 1987). This was the first time the government officially designated any space in the 
Slough to be protected, be it natural or manmade, from a city zoning standpoint. The following 
year, the city developed environmental protection and conservation zones for areas with 
important natural resources. This was still mostly a zoning regulation in that environmental 
protection areas were not to be developed but conservation areas could have some development, 
provided the proper measures were taken to control pollution (Portland 1987).  
These were important first steps in preserving the future of what little natural space the 
Slough had, but the City had no intention of ever slowing or reducing the economic hub that the 
Slough had become. In 1989, the Portland Development Commission established the Airport 
Way Urban Renewal Area as an industrial sanctuary, making development and economic growth 
its highest priority while setting the goal to create 20,000 new jobs over the next twenty years 
(Portland 1987). Industrial use of the Slough was not being displaced, it was being preserved. 
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The difference was that the City was now recognizing the Slough as not just a ditch for effluent, 
but a natural space, however small. 
 In 1990, the City developed the Columbia South Shore Natural Resources Management 
Plan (NRMP). The plan would be revised multiple times over the next few years by citizen 
appeal for the twenty-five foot conservation easement along the length of the Slough to be 
expanded to fifty feet. The change would be adopted in 1993 as progress toward environmental 
reclamation in the Slough moved forward. The NRMP also called for protection of various small 
wetlands, lakes, and water bodies throughout the watershed, restricting outfalls and other 
potentially pollutant point-sources surrounding them (Portland 1990). This same year, the Smith 
and Bybee Lakes Natural Area was officially established as the first protected natural area in the 
Slough as a part of the Oregon Natural Areas Program. These events set the scene for the closing 
of the landfill in St. Johns in 1991, which bordered the Slough and the Smith and Bybee 
wetlands.  
 
St. Johns Landfill 
 In 1940, the banks of Bybee Lake were designated as the site for the next municipal 
dump. The St. Johns Landfill (Fig. 2), ten minutes due north of downtown Portland would serve 
north Portland, St. Johns, Kenton, and the other surrounding towns and neighborhoods for the 
next fifty years, collecting primarily domestic waste but also industrial waste from a pesticide 
manufacturing facility from 1958-1962 (Speirs 2012). While in operation, the landfill received 
an estimated fourteen million tons of waste before its closure in 1991 (Metro 2017). Serving an 
extensive region that included residential and industrial waste, the landfill drew heavy truck 
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traffic and resulted in trash illegally dumped along the road, under bridges, and in the 
neighboring Columbia Slough (Spears 2012). These negative side effects of the St. John’s 
Landfill drew the ire of Jacob Benshoof, a local activist who grew up in St. Johns, who would 
become the leader of the movement to close the dump. Backed by the St. Johns Development 
Corporation, Benshoof made several enemies in the county, city, and regional government. In 
addition to its basic service to the region as a landfill, the St. John’s Landfill generated 
considerable revenue for the city, making it a particularly valuable public asset.  
Benshoof and the St. John’s Development Corporation found that the landfill was in 
violation of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act, a federal law that prohibited the long term storage 
of waste near waterways. The St. John’s Landfill in this case bordered the Smith and Bybee 
Wetlands and the Columbia Slough, putting it in direct violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 
So along with a few other local organizations, the St. John’s Development Corporation sued the 
City of Portland and won, 
sealing the fate of the St. 
John’s Landfill (Speirs 
2012).  
 The regional 
governing body, Metro, 
took over the operations of 
St. John’s Landfill in 1980 
and full ownership in 1990 
Fig. 12: St Johns Landill, 1972 
  Pemberton 59 
as it assumed the responsibility for permanently closing the landfill. As a result of the landfill 
lawsuit, Metro was tasked with developing a solution to contain the landfill, and prevent 
contaminants from leaching into the Slough and lakes. The result was a $36 million containment 
system that encapsulates the entire 230-acre landfill (Metro 2017). Completed in 1996, the 
surface of the contained landfill was planted with native prairie plants and given the 
classification as a nature preserve with no public access. Amazingly, the dump-top prairie has 
been remarkably successful, harboring tons of species including deer, beaver, coyote, and prairie 
birds.  
The containment system is continuously monitored by the Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality, with erosion being the primary concern for the integrity of the 
containment system (Fitzgibbon 1999). Additionally, the methane produced by the landfill, 
which was originally burned off on site, is sold to a local cement company who uses it as fuel for 
their lime kilns, creating a small revenue stream for Metro. Altogether, the closure of the SJL has 
been a success (Mortenson 2011). 
 With the SJL closed, the momentum of the Slough’s environmental advocates continued 
through the early 1990s. In December 1991, the nonprofit, Northwest Environmental Advocates 
(NEA), brought a suit against the City of Portland for allowing combined sewer overflows 
(CSOs) to discharge raw sewage into the Slough during heavy rain events. The suit called out the 
CSO system for violating the Clean Water Act and demanded that the City make the changes 
necessary to comply with water quality standards (Speirs 2012). To comply, the City set off on a 
$1.4 billion, twenty-year long project called simply “The Big Pipe Project,” which made the 
sewer pipes bigger so they overflowed into the Columbia Slough and Willamette River less 
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frequently (State of Oregon 2010).  
In 1993, NEA spearheaded a community-based campaign against the City and other state 
government organizations over the toxicity of fish caught in the Slough. They made several press 
releases and led efforts to educate the public about the dangers of consuming fish caught in the 
Slough, a public health concern that had not been addressed by government agencies. NEA 
found that the dangers of consuming Slough fish disproportionately affected minorities because 
more minorities lived in close proximity to and fished in the Slough, raising questions around 
environmental racism and feigned ignorance to the risks affecting a predominantly minority 
population in Slough anglers (Stroud 1999). Again, this public attention raised awareness of the 
unique environmental issues in the Slough.  
 The year 1993 continued to be productive for conservation in the Slough. The NRMP 
changes were rewritten and rolled into the new Natural Resources Protection Plan (NRPP) that 
included the fifty-foot conservation easement along the length of the Slough and around many of 
the lakes and small water bodies in the watershed (Portland 1993). Additionally, that same year 
the Columbia Slough Watershed Council (CSWC) was established to provide a forum for 
citizens, businesses, activists, government agencies, landowners, and recreationists to come 
together in support of the watershed as a whole. The CSWC has since been instrumental in 
educating the public, especially children, about the watershed, how it works hydrologically and 
ecologically. 
 More educational programs would be established by the City of Portland in 1996 through 
the Columbia Slough Revitalization Program, which was a City-led program funded by a $10 
million grant from the EPA. The program used the money to fund projects in education/ outreach 
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and mitigation to help the Slough improve its poor ecological health. Such projects included 
scientific research studying sediments and water quality, landowner incentive programs, 
revegetation and habitat conservation, and educational projects including angler outreach, 
environmental educators in k-12 schools, storm drain stenciling, community and school-based 
tours, classes, field trips, and informational kiosks throughout the community. The grant took the 
momentum that started in the late 1980s and gained traction around the turn of the decade with 
the SJL closure and the NEA lawsuits and awareness campaigns, launching the Slough into a 
new era of natural resource management and environmental education. 
 
Current efforts changing the Sloughscape 
 In 2005, the City of Portland (2005) created the Portland Watershed Management Plan 
(PWMP) with the focus of improving the ecological health of five urban watersheds, one of 
which was the Columbia Slough. The stated purpose of the plan was to “improve watershed 
conditions,” and within the plan they detail goals that support this purpose, such as restoring 
riparian habitat, regulating stormwater outfalls, and protecting native species (Portland 2005). 
The effects of this plan and other projects in the Slough aimed at restoring ecological health have 
already begun to change the landscape of the watershed. 
In 1999, anadromous salmonids were listed under the Endangered Species Act, and two 
years later they were found in the lower Slough. This led to increased monitoring of water 
quality and multi-agency habitat restoration projects like the Columbia Slough Confluence 
Habitat Enhancement Project, which, completed in 2010, increased and improved habitat for all 
wetland species in the lower Slough (CSWC 2013). Another project owned by the City with the 
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collaboration of several agencies is the Mason Flats Wetland Enhancement Project, located at 
NE Mason and Airport Way in the Big Four Corners Natural Area, was completed in 2013, 
restoring more wetland habitat. Even the USACE has undertaken habitat restoration projects in 
the Slough. In 2003, the 1135 Restoration Project was completed, enhancing riparian habitat and 
removing five culverts along seven miles of the middle and upper stretches of the Slough. These 
are just a few examples of the larger capital projects led by government agencies to help improve 
watershed conditions (Portland 2015). Many other smaller scale projects and frequent work 
parties organized by the CSWC have made great strides in managing invasive species and 
removing trash and debris from the watershed (CSWC 2013). 
 In 2015, as a part of the long-term watershed monitoring, the Bureau of Environmental 
Services began issuing annual environmental health report cards for watersheds and parts of 
watersheds under the PWMP. The Slough's grades were as follows, hydrology: B-; water quality: 
B-; habitat: D-; and fish and wildlife: F (Portland 2015).  No real conclusions can be drawn on 
these grades independently, but they may prove to be a useful tracking tool as time goes on and 
more projects are completed. 
 Aside from the physical health of the watershed, funding from the PWMP and others like 
it is being used for watershed education (Portland 2005; CSWC 2013), which indirectly benefits 
the natural landscape by cultivating a well-informed culture (Hibbard and Lupie 2006). A culture 
that understands and appreciates their home watershed promotes conservation and changes the 
landscape in a more abstract way than the other programs and projects. The assumption is that 
people who are educated about their watershed will make choices in their daily lives and 
possibly vote for representatives and issues that benefit the environment. Education is the long-
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term plan for creating a healthier natural landscape. 
 
Conclusion 
The Columbia Slough exists today as a landscape of seemingly incongruous neighbors 
with a long history of conflicting agendas. Protected natural areas replete with wildlife in rich 
wetland ecosystems adjoin cement factories with billowing smokestacks, enormous warehouses 
with constant freight traffic, and giant shopping centers, parking lots, and freeways. The levees 
built by the drainage district in the early twentieth century opened the door for the developers 
and the industrialists to take advantage of the Slough’s premium accessibility, location, and 
situation. Most people traveling in the watershed are not aware of the Slough or the wildlife that 
lurks just out of sight. Development in the Slough has explicitly tried to hide its natural elements 
from view, creating a landscape dominated by concrete and asphalt. From early logging in the 
watershed by Portland's forefathers to the drainage culture of the early twentieth century to the 
toxic polluters that followed the levees, the Slough has had a long history of declining 
environmental health. However, because of increased efforts to create a public natural amenity in 
the watershed, changes in the landscape have taken place. As the perspective of wetlands has 
shifted over the past century, so has the Slough landscape by way of new policies and programs. 
Lewis writes that “Our human landscape is our unwitting autobiography, reflecting our 
tastes, our values, our aspirations, and even our fears in tangible, visible form” (1979, 12). The 
tastes, values, and aspirations revealed in the Columbia Slough landscape are those that have 
consistently prioritized utility and economy over nature. This is evident through the history of 
wetland policy, draining and farming wetlands were federally subsidized activities until the 
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1950s. This converted millions of acres across of wetlands across the country into farms, 
displacing wildlife and native vegetation. In the case where these drained wetlands provided 
excellent accessibility, situation, and location near an urban center, such as the Columbia Slough, 
they were developed into industrialized economic hubs that dominate the landscape. But whether 
farm or economic hub, pollution became an issue, and starting around the 1960s, new federal 
policies aimed at protecting the environment were established. The effects of these policies 
began changing in the Columbia Slough landscape in the 1980s with the establishment of 
conservation zones, regulated effluent, and public natural space. Today, aided strongly by the 
Portland Watershed Management Plan for the Columbia Slough (2005), there is a concerted 
effort to create a healthier watershed for wildlife, plants, and humans alike.  
 Looking at the whole landscape together, and reading it in its historical context, it 
is evident that cultural values toward the Slough have changed. As wetland policies have shifted 
at the federal and local levels, the landscape has reflected these changing values with more space 
for the natural wetland landscape to function. However, the efforts to restore the natural 
landscape are not to achieve some paradigm shift where natural capital overtakes economic 
capital; the Slough is a not a landscape that will be an expansive natural wetland again in the 
near future. Instead, these wild enclaves amidst an industrialized landscape serve the community 
as a park, creating a space that is used for recreation, wildlife viewing, and education. This has 
created the highly integrated physical landscape of built and natural environments seen in the 
Slough today: an otherwise economic landscape punctuated by wild enclaves that is treasured 
simultaneously for its wildness and industry. 
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